list_device_events
The MULTI-PRODUCER device TELEMETRY event stream (#1160/#1208) — every DECISION and STATE TRANSITION reported about the capture pipeline by the iOS app OR by the PAC/proxy server (public.device_events, 14-day retention, weekly-partitioned). iOS kinds — this list is what the app ACTUALLY emits, co...
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What list_device_events does on Busymate DevTools
AI agents call list_device_events to retrieve information from Busymate DevTools without modifying anything. It is typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
host | string | — | Exact bare host. |
level | string | — | Telemetry tier. |
limit | number | — | Max events (default 50, cap 200). |
since | string | — | ISO — only events with at >= this. |
until | string | — | ISO — only events with at <= this. |
action | string | — | Exact action verb (the dotted kind is category.action, e.g. capture + health). |
reason | string | — | Exact machine reason slug (e.g. no_ca_key). |
boot_id | string | — | One process lifetime — pair with seq to walk a single boot's ordered stream. |
outcome | string | — | Exact outcome (armed|inert|ok|fail|deny|start|stop|decrypted|…). |
user_id | string | — | auth.users.id (#1160) stamped AT EMIT — 'everything this user did on the device', across an account switch (never re-attributed to the current owner). |
category | string | — | Exact category, ACROSS ALL PRODUCERS. iOS emits: capture|cert|config|tunnel|app|auth|device|permission|control|applink|mitm|push. PAC/proxy emits: process|net|c |
failures | boolean | — | true → only outcome ∈ fail|deny|inert (the indexed failure path). |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why list_device_events is rated Low
Even though list_device_events only reads data, uncontrolled read access leaks sensitive information and racks up API costs: an agent caught in a retry loop can make thousands of calls a minute without anyone noticing.
Risk signalsAccepts URL/endpoint input (host) · High parameter count (22 properties) · Bulk/mass operation — affects multiple targets
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs list_device_events safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Busymate DevTools, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For list_device_events, this is the rule to start with:
list_device_events is read-only, so it stays allowed. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Busymate DevTools, apply this rule, and every list_device_events call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about list_device_events
The MULTI-PRODUCER device TELEMETRY event stream (#1160/#1208) — every DECISION and STATE TRANSITION reported about the capture pipeline by the iOS app OR by the PAC/proxy server (public.device_events, 14-day retention, weekly-partitioned). iOS kinds — this list is what the app ACTUALLY emits, corrected in #1232 after SEVEN of the fifteen declared categories turned out to have zero emit sites and zero rows while this description told operators they existed. BASELINE (always on, no flag): capture.health (armed|inert + why + decrypt counters), cert.state, config.applied / config.fetch, tunnel.lifecycle, app.launch / app.phase, auth.signin / auth.switch / auth.signout / auth.token_refresh, device.pair, permission.vpn_consent / permission.notifications, control.channel / control.recovery, applink.open / applink.replay (query parameter NAMES only, fragment PRESENCE only — never a value), push.received (the RESOLVED action, so the deliberate broadcast+wake double delivery reads as stop-then-noop). AUDIT TIER (opt-in, TTL-expiring): mitm.decision, and it is FAULT-ONLY by design — only no_engine / leaf_mint_failed / ca_untrusted / upstream_failed ever produce a row, so a healthy device emits NONE however long audit mode is armed; the per-host answer for decrypted / out_of_scope / no_sni / pinned lives on entries.payload.mitmDecision under owner-scoped RLS, which is the right home for browsing-shaped data. Plus the server-authored telemetry.rate_clipped / audit_mode.ended breadcrumbs. The iOS app does NOT emit ui.*, net.* or process.* — those three were retired from its vocabulary in #1232 (see the category filter below: net and process are still live, from the PAC/proxy producer). PAC/proxy kinds (#1208): process.lifecycle, push.realtime, config.settings / config.port_allocation / config.port_release / config.pac_serve, capture.entry / capture.flush / capture.drop, net.forward / net.retry / net.dead_letter, tunnel.connect / tunnel.close, mitm.decision / mitm.handshake. Newest-first slim rows { id, at (server receive time), device_uuid, level (baseline|debug), category, action (the dotted kind = category.action), outcome, reason, host, ts (device clock), boot_id, seq, app_build, ios_version, process_role, user_id, session_id, auth_provider, install_id, tenant_id, request_id, producer }. The identity block (#1160) + request_id (#1390) are FIRST-CLASS columns, not buried in detail: process_role (app|tunnel|proxy-server), the user/session/provider/install/tenant the event was emitted under, and request_id — which JOINs public.audit_log.request_id so a device event and its server-side audit consequence link into ONE incident. producer is the PROCESS DISCRIMINATOR, hoisted out of detail into EVERY slim row (no with_detail needed) because the whole isolation contract rests on it: 'proxy-server' for PAC/proxy rows; NULL for legacy rows that carry no producer key at all, and 'ios' where the app stamps one — null is a real fact about the row and is NEVER normalised to 'ios'. iOS-authored rows carry ts/boot_id/seq/app_build/ios_version; PAC/proxy rows leave those five NULL by construction and carry transport / proxy_build / node_version / process_boot_id / producer_seq inside detail. with_detail:true adds the redacted detail jsonb (≤4 KB, redacted at write — parameter NAMES only, never query values/bodies/keys). A gap in (boot_id, seq) = a dropped iOS event; a gap in detail.producer_seq = a dropped proxy event (both detectable at read time even when the drop counter itself was lost). Filters: category / action / outcome / reason / host / boot_id / process_role / user_id / session_id / install_id / request_id (exact), level, producer, failures:true (outcome ∈ fail|deny|inert — the partial-index fast path), since / until (ISO, on at). DEFAULT WINDOW (#1390): with no since and no cursor the read is bounded to the last 48h (so an unfiltered fleet sweep can never time out); the response echoes since_applied + default_window:true — pass an explicit since to reach older telemetry, or a keyset cursor (which is exempt from the default). producer:'ios' means the PROJECTION-ELIGIBLE set — producer IS NULL or 'ios', byte-identical to the device_events_project_health trigger's WHEN clause — so it never hides pre-#1208 rows; any other slug is an exact match, so a FUTURE producer is filterable the day it starts emitting. Producer gating applies ONLY to the iOS-only device_health projection (see get_device_health): the broadcast trigger is unconditional, so device_events:<uuid> and device_events:all carry EVERY producer's row live, and so does this tool when producer is omitted. KEYSET pagination: when a page is full, feed next_cursor's before_at + before_id back verbatim (both together — a bulk insert lands a whole batch on ONE timestamp, so at-only paging would skip batches). ONE device by device_uuid/deviceName (owner-scoped: without devices:view you may read YOUR OWN device), or omit the selector for the FLEET-WIDE stream (devices:view operators only, re-verified server-side). limit default 50, cap 200. It is categorised as a Read tool in the Busymate DevTools MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.
list_device_events accepts 12 parameters: host, level, limit, since, until, action, reason, boot_id, outcome, user_id, category, failures. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Busymate DevTools MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for list_device_events: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Busymate DevTools. Nothing to install.
list_device_events is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the list_device_events rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for list_device_events. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
list_device_events is provided by the Busymate DevTools MCP server (https://mcp.busymate.dev). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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