check_address_poisoning
chainpeek: Check a transfer recipient for address poisoning: lookalikes in the sender's history. For balance, gas and blacklist checks too use transfer_preflight; for OFAC use check_sanctions. Returns a risk (high | medium | low) for paying to: reads from's transfers of one token (default USDC) o...
This record as markdown: /tools/dev-tanod-tanod/check-address-poisoning.md
What check_address_poisoning does on Tanod
AI agents call check_address_poisoning to retrieve information from Tanod without modifying anything. It is typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
to | string | Yes | The recipient about to be paid (0x + 40 hex). Must differ from `from`. |
from | string | Yes | The sending wallet whose transfer history is read (0x + 40 hex). |
chain | string | Yes | ethereum, base or robinhood (Robinhood Chain, chain id 4663). |
token | string | — | USDC (default), USDT, or a token contract address. Only this token's transfers are read. On robinhood pass a contract address. |
contacts | object | — | Up to 100 addresses you trust (your address book); `to` is compared with them too, without any chain read. |
dust_threshold | object | — | Incoming transfers below this many token units count as dust. Default 0.01 for USDC and USDT; off for other tokens unless set; 0 turns it off. |
lookback_blocks | integer | — | How many of the latest blocks of history to read (0-2,000; default 2,000, about 67 minutes on Base and 6.7 hours on Ethereum). 0 reads nothing and checks `conta |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why check_address_poisoning is rated Low
Even though check_address_poisoning only reads data, uncontrolled read access leaks sensitive information and racks up API costs: an agent caught in a retry loop can make thousands of calls a minute without anyone noticing.
Risk signalsHandles credentials or secrets (token)
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs check_address_poisoning safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Tanod, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For check_address_poisoning, this is the rule to start with:
check_address_poisoning is read-only, so it stays allowed. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Tanod, apply this rule, and every check_address_poisoning call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about check_address_poisoning
chainpeek: Check a transfer recipient for address poisoning: lookalikes in the sender's history. For balance, gas and blacklist checks too use transfer_preflight; for OFAC use check_sanctions. Returns a risk (high | medium | low) for paying to: reads from's transfers of one token (default USDC) over the last 2,000 blocks and finds addresses with to's first 4 and last 4 hex characters; each reason carries its evidence (tx hash, block, amount, direction). High: to was never paid and imitates an address from paid or a contact, or appears only in zero-value or dust transfers. Medium: a lookalike exists but to was paid or is a contact. Older history, other tokens and other lookalikes are not seen. Bad input is a 422, a failed read a 502 (neither charged). Typically 0.5-4 s. Price: USD 0.002. Free: 10 chain reads per IP per UTC day. Docs: https://tanod.dev/learn/address-poisoning-check-api.html. It is categorised as a Read tool in the Tanod MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.
check_address_poisoning accepts 7 parameters: to, from, chain, token, contacts, dust_threshold, lookback_blocks. Required: to, from, chain. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Tanod MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for check_address_poisoning: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Tanod. Nothing to install.
check_address_poisoning is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the check_address_poisoning rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for check_address_poisoning. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
check_address_poisoning is provided by the Tanod MCP server (https://tanod.dev/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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