check_sanctions
chainpeek: screen one crypto address against the US OFAC SDN list's digital currency addresses. For up to 1,000 addresses use check_sanctions_batch; for lookalikes use check_address_poisoning. EVM and bech32 addresses match case-insensitively; base58 BTC, TRX and other formats must match exactly ...
This record as markdown: /tools/dev-tanod-tanod/check-sanctions.md
What check_sanctions does on Tanod
AI agents call check_sanctions to retrieve information from Tanod without modifying anything. It is typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
address | string | Yes | Crypto address: EVM 0x address, bech32, or a BTC/TRX/other address exactly as listed. |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why check_sanctions is rated Low
Even though check_sanctions only reads data, uncontrolled read access leaks sensitive information and racks up API costs: an agent caught in a retry loop can make thousands of calls a minute without anyone noticing.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs check_sanctions safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Tanod, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For check_sanctions, this is the rule to start with:
check_sanctions is read-only, so it stays allowed. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Tanod, apply this rule, and every check_sanctions call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about check_sanctions
chainpeek: screen one crypto address against the US OFAC SDN list's digital currency addresses. For up to 1,000 addresses use check_sanctions_batch; for lookalikes use check_address_poisoning. EVM and bech32 addresses match case-insensitively; base58 BTC, TRX and other formats must match exactly as listed. Screening against the US OFAC SDN digital-currency-address list only (the Treasury SDN list's published crypto addresses), as of the list_date in the answer; a non-match does not clear an address; not legal advice or a full compliance check (no other sanctions lists, no clustering, ownership or exposure analysis); verify any match at sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov. Local lookup, typically under 0.1 s (first call up to 1 s). Price: USD 0.002. Free: 10 chain reads per IP per UTC day. Docs: https://tanod.dev/learn/check-crypto-address-sanctions.html. It is categorised as a Read tool in the Tanod MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.
check_sanctions accepts 1 parameter: address. Required: address. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Tanod MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for check_sanctions: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Tanod. Nothing to install.
check_sanctions is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the check_sanctions rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for check_sanctions. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
check_sanctions is provided by the Tanod MCP server (https://tanod.dev/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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