text_encode
utilpeek: Encode or decode text: base64, hex, URL, punycode, JWT decode, ... For digests use hash_text; for a JWT's claims use decode_jwt. Returns the text encoded or decoded with codec: base64, base64url, base32, hex, url (percent), html (entities), quoted_printable, rot13, punycode, idna or jwt...
This record as markdown: /tools/dev-tanod-tanod/text-encode.md
What text_encode does on Tanod
AI agents call text_encode to retrieve information from Tanod without modifying anything. It is typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
text | string | Yes | At most 100,000 characters; never logged; a JWT is never echoed back. |
codec | string | Yes | base64, base64url, base32, hex, url, html, quoted_printable, rot13, punycode, idna or jwt (decode only; the signature is never verified). |
direction | string | — | encode (default) or decode; jwt is decode only. |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why text_encode is rated Low
Even though text_encode only reads data, uncontrolled read access leaks sensitive information and racks up API costs: an agent caught in a retry loop can make thousands of calls a minute without anyone noticing.
Risk signalsBulk/mass operation — affects multiple targets
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs text_encode safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Tanod, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For text_encode, this is the rule to start with:
text_encode is read-only, so it stays allowed. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Tanod, apply this rule, and every text_encode call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about text_encode
utilpeek: Encode or decode text: base64, hex, URL, punycode, JWT decode, ... For digests use hash_text; for a JWT's claims use decode_jwt. Returns the text encoded or decoded with codec: base64, base64url, base32, hex, url (percent), html (entities), quoted_printable, rot13, punycode, idna or jwt. Decoders are strict (bad input is a 422 decode_failed); bytes that are not UTF-8 come back as output_base64. jwt is decode only: the header and payload are decoded and the signature is NEVER verified (every reply says signature_verified: false), so a decoded token proves nothing about who issued it; the token is never echoed back. Typically under 0.3 s. Price: USD 0.001. Free: 10 utilpeek calls per IP per UTC day. The submitted text is never logged or stored. It is categorised as a Read tool in the Tanod MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.
text_encode accepts 3 parameters: text, codec, direction. Required: text, codec. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Tanod MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for text_encode: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Tanod. Nothing to install.
text_encode is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the text_encode rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for text_encode. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
text_encode is provided by the Tanod MCP server (https://tanod.dev/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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