text_unicode_inspect
utilpeek: Find invisible, bidi and homoglyph Unicode characters in text. For injected instructions use check_text_for_prompt_injection. Returns a security-oriented Unicode inspection: risk (low / medium / high) with reasons; invisible characters (zero-width, tag characters that can smuggle prompt...
This record as markdown: /tools/dev-tanod-tanod/text-unicode-inspect.md
What text_unicode_inspect does on Tanod
AI agents call text_unicode_inspect to retrieve information from Tanod without modifying anything. It is typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
text | string | Yes | The text (at most 200,000 characters). |
skeleton | boolean | — | UTS #39 confusable skeleton of the whole text. |
normalize | object | — | Also return the text in this normalization form: NFC, NFD, NFKC or NFKD (default none). |
list_chars | integer | — | List the first N code points with name / category. |
strip_invisible | boolean | — | Return the text without bidi / zero-width / tag / control characters. |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why text_unicode_inspect is rated Low
Even though text_unicode_inspect only reads data, uncontrolled read access leaks sensitive information and racks up API costs: an agent caught in a retry loop can make thousands of calls a minute without anyone noticing.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs text_unicode_inspect safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Tanod, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For text_unicode_inspect, this is the rule to start with:
text_unicode_inspect is read-only, so it stays allowed. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Tanod, apply this rule, and every text_unicode_inspect call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about text_unicode_inspect
utilpeek: Find invisible, bidi and homoglyph Unicode characters in text. For injected instructions use check_text_for_prompt_injection. Returns a security-oriented Unicode inspection: risk (low / medium / high) with reasons; invisible characters (zero-width, tag characters that can smuggle prompt-injection text, controls) with positions; bidi controls (Trojan Source, CVE-2021-42574); UTS #39 confusables and mixed-script words (pаypal with a Cyrillic а); combining-mark floods; scripts and normalization status; optionally the text normalized or with invisible characters stripped. Typically under 1 s. Price: USD 0.001. Free: 10 utilpeek calls per IP per UTC day. The submitted text is never logged or stored. Docs: https://tanod.dev/learn/detect-ascii-smuggling-invisible-unicode-api.html. It is categorised as a Read tool in the Tanod MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.
text_unicode_inspect accepts 5 parameters: text, skeleton, normalize, list_chars, strip_invisible. Required: text. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Tanod MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for text_unicode_inspect: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Tanod. Nothing to install.
text_unicode_inspect is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the text_unicode_inspect rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for text_unicode_inspect. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
text_unicode_inspect is provided by the Tanod MCP server (https://tanod.dev/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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