util_webhook_signature_timestamp_check
Webhook Signature Timestamp Check checks webhook timestamp age and future skew before signature verification from bounded caller-supplied values without an external provider. Call Webhook Signature Timestamp Check before accepting, caching, redirecting, or retrying a caller-supplied web response....
This record as markdown: /tools/io-github-davidmosiah-delx-protocol/util-webhook-signature-timestamp-check.md
What util_webhook_signature_timestamp_check does on Delx Protocol — Agent Recovery & Continuity
AI agents call util_webhook_signature_timestamp_check to retrieve information from Delx Protocol — Agent Recovery & Continuity without modifying anything. It is typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
now_epoch | integer | Yes | Now Epoch supplied to Webhook Signature Timestamp Check; used only for this bounded calculation and processed in memory without retention. |
timestamp_epoch | integer | Yes | Timestamp Epoch supplied to Webhook Signature Timestamp Check; used only for this bounded calculation and processed in memory without retention. |
maximum_age_seconds | integer | Yes | Maximum Age Seconds supplied to Webhook Signature Timestamp Check; used only for this bounded calculation and processed in memory without retention. |
maximum_future_skew_seconds | integer | Yes | Maximum Future Skew Seconds supplied to Webhook Signature Timestamp Check; used only for this bounded calculation and processed in memory without retention. |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why util_webhook_signature_timestamp_check is rated Low
Even though util_webhook_signature_timestamp_check only reads data, uncontrolled read access leaks sensitive information and racks up API costs: an agent caught in a retry loop can make thousands of calls a minute without anyone noticing.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs util_webhook_signature_timestamp_check safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Delx Protocol — Agent Recovery & Continuity, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For util_webhook_signature_timestamp_check, this is the rule to start with:
util_webhook_signature_timestamp_check is read-only, so it stays allowed. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Delx Protocol — Agent Recovery & Continuity, apply this rule, and every util_webhook_signature_timestamp_check call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about util_webhook_signature_timestamp_check
Webhook Signature Timestamp Check checks webhook timestamp age and future skew before signature verification from bounded caller-supplied values without an external provider. Call Webhook Signature Timestamp Check before accepting, caching, redirecting, or retrying a caller-supplied web response. Returns normalized web evidence, the computed finding, and an explicit pass or advisory status for Webhook Signature Timestamp Check as versioned deterministic JSON. Limitation: Evaluates only caller-supplied metadata; it performs no DNS lookup, HTTP request, web search, credential use, or persistent storage. It is categorised as a Read tool in the Delx Protocol — Agent Recovery & Continuity MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.
util_webhook_signature_timestamp_check accepts 4 parameters: now_epoch, timestamp_epoch, maximum_age_seconds, maximum_future_skew_seconds. Required: now_epoch, timestamp_epoch, maximum_age_seconds, maximum_future_skew_seconds. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Delx Protocol — Agent Recovery & Continuity MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for util_webhook_signature_timestamp_check: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Delx Protocol — Agent Recovery & Continuity. Nothing to install.
util_webhook_signature_timestamp_check is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the util_webhook_signature_timestamp_check rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for util_webhook_signature_timestamp_check. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
util_webhook_signature_timestamp_check is provided by the Delx Protocol — Agent Recovery & Continuity MCP server (https://api.delx.ai/v1/mcp?src=registry). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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