adb_qemu_guest_shell
Execute a shell command on a QEMU guest VM via ADB. The VM must be connected first (use adb_qemu_connect). The guest serial is derived internally — no user-supplied host/IP reaches the ADB binary. Subject to the same security middleware checks as adb_shell.
This record as markdown: /tools/io-github-fullread-deepadb/adb-qemu-guest-shell.md
What adb_qemu_guest_shell does on Deepadb
AI agents invoke adb_qemu_guest_shell to trigger actions in Deepadb. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call: builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
Why adb_qemu_guest_shell is rated High
This tool executes arbitrary shell commands on a QEMU guest VM, making it Execute rather than Read/Write. While it includes mitigations (internal serial derivation, security middleware checks), the capability to run arbitrary commands means misuse could pivot to data exfiltration, persistence, lateral movement, or destructive actions.
From the tool's definition Execute a shell command on a QEMU guest VM via ADB — the tool explicitly runs shell commands, which is the quintessential Execute action. The description confirms it accepts commands as arguments to run on a guest system.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs adb_qemu_guest_shell safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Deepadb, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For adb_qemu_guest_shell, this is the rule to start with:
adb_qemu_guest_shell stays usable, but rate-capped: a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Deepadb, apply this rule, and every adb_qemu_guest_shell call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about adb_qemu_guest_shell
Execute a shell command on a QEMU guest VM via ADB. The VM must be connected first (use adb_qemu_connect). The guest serial is derived internally — no user-supplied host/IP reaches the ADB binary. Subject to the same security middleware checks as adb_shell. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Deepadb MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the Deepadb MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for adb_qemu_guest_shell: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Deepadb. Nothing to install.
adb_qemu_guest_shell is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the adb_qemu_guest_shell rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for adb_qemu_guest_shell. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
adb_qemu_guest_shell is provided by the Deepadb MCP server (deepadb). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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