Forward locally detected GitHub/GitLab tokens (gh CLI, env vars, git credential helper, vault) to one or more owned remote Yaver machines via the same /machine/onboarding/apply endpoint as the dashboard. Lets a fresh remote box (Hetzner runner, managed cloud, …) get clone-pull creds plus CI/deplo...
AI agents use git_push_creds to create or update resources in Yaver — usually the action step of a workflow, after the agent has gathered context. Every call changes real data in your Yaver environment.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
all | boolean | — | Fan out to every owned online peer (excludes this machine) |
notes | string | — | |
provider | string | — | Which provider(s) to push (default all) |
device_id | string | — | Single owned remote device ID or alias |
device_ids | array | — | Multiple owned remote device IDs/aliases |
apply_clone | boolean | — | Write clone/pull credentials on each target (default true) |
gitlab_host | string | — | Defaults to gitlab.com |
github_token | string | — | Override auto-detection (omit to detect locally) |
gitlab_token | string | — | Override auto-detection (omit to detect locally) |
apply_ci_token | boolean | — | Write CI/deploy vault token on each target (default true) |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
An AI agent can call git_push_creds faster than any human can review — one bad instruction and it creates or modifies resources in Yaver by the hundred, each call as confident as the last.
Risk signalsHigh parameter count (10 properties)
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Forward locally detected GitHub/GitLab tokens (gh CLI, env vars, git credential helper, vault) to one or more owned remote Yaver machines via the same /machine/onboarding/apply endpoint as the dashboard. Lets a fresh remote box (Hetzner runner, managed cloud, …) get clone-pull creds plus CI/deploy vault tokens without re-pasting a PAT. Self is always excluded — use machine_onboarding_apply or vault tools for the local machine. Tokens never reach Convex. It is categorised as a Write tool in the Yaver MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
git_push_creds accepts 10 parameters: all, notes, provider, device_id, device_ids, apply_clone, gitlab_host, github_token, gitlab_token, apply_ci_token. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Yaver MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for git_push_creds: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Yaver. Nothing to install.
git_push_creds is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the git_push_creds rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for git_push_creds. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
git_push_creds is provided by the Yaver MCP server (yaver-cli). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.