git_push_creds
Forward locally detected GitHub/GitLab tokens (gh CLI, env vars, git credential helper, vault) to one or more owned remote Yaver machines via the same /machine/onboarding/apply endpoint as the dashboard. Lets a fresh remote box (Hetzner runner, managed cloud, …) get clone-pull creds plus CI/deplo...
This record as markdown: /tools/io-github-kivanccakmak-yaver/git-push-creds.md
What git_push_creds does on Yaver
AI agents use git_push_creds to create or update resources in Yaver, usually the action step of a workflow, after the agent has gathered context. Every call changes real data in your Yaver environment.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
all | boolean | — | Fan out to every owned online peer (excludes this machine) |
notes | string | — | |
provider | string | — | Which provider(s) to push (default all) |
device_id | string | — | Single owned remote device ID or alias |
device_ids | array | — | Multiple owned remote device IDs/aliases |
apply_clone | boolean | — | Write clone/pull credentials on each target (default true) |
gitlab_host | string | — | Defaults to gitlab.com |
github_token | string | — | Override auto-detection (omit to detect locally) |
gitlab_token | string | — | Override auto-detection (omit to detect locally) |
apply_ci_token | boolean | — | Write CI/deploy vault token on each target (default true) |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why git_push_creds is rated Medium
The tool creates or propagates credentials/secrets to remote machines, which is a reversible configuration modification. While it handles sensitive tokens, the core action is writing/installing credentials to remote systems rather than executing arbitrary code or destructively deleting data.
From the tool's definition Tool description states it 'Forward[s] locally detected GitHub/GitLab tokens... to one or more owned remote Yaver machines' via an endpoint. This modifies remote machine credentials/configuration state.
Risk signalsHigh parameter count (10 properties)
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs git_push_creds safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Yaver, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For git_push_creds, this is the rule to start with:
git_push_creds stays usable, but capped: an agent stuck in a loop can't make hundreds of changes a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Yaver, apply this rule, and every git_push_creds call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about git_push_creds
Forward locally detected GitHub/GitLab tokens (gh CLI, env vars, git credential helper, vault) to one or more owned remote Yaver machines via the same /machine/onboarding/apply endpoint as the dashboard. Lets a fresh remote box (Hetzner runner, managed cloud, …) get clone-pull creds plus CI/deploy vault tokens without re-pasting a PAT. Self is always excluded — use machine_onboarding_apply or vault tools for the local machine. Tokens never reach Convex. It is categorised as a Write tool in the Yaver MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
git_push_creds accepts 10 parameters: all, notes, provider, device_id, device_ids, apply_clone, gitlab_host, github_token, gitlab_token, apply_ci_token. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Yaver MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for git_push_creds: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Yaver. Nothing to install.
git_push_creds is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the git_push_creds rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for git_push_creds. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
git_push_creds is provided by the Yaver MCP server (yaver-cli). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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