runner_auth_browser_submit_code
Submit a copied authentication code/token back into a running runner browser-auth session.
This record as markdown: /tools/io-github-kivanccakmak-yaver/runner-auth-browser-submit-code.md
What runner_auth_browser_submit_code does on Yaver
AI agents invoke runner_auth_browser_submit_code to trigger actions in Yaver. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call: builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
code | string | Yes | |
device_id | string | — | Optional remote device ID |
session_id | string | Yes |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why runner_auth_browser_submit_code is rated High
This tool actively submits an authentication token into a running browser session, triggering an external authentication operation. It executes an action (completing an auth flow) rather than just reading or writing data. Misuse could allow an AI agent to authenticate as someone else or hijack a session, hence medium severity.
From the tool's definition Submit a copied authentication code/token back into a running runner browser-auth session
Risk signalsAccepts freeform code/query input (code)
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs runner_auth_browser_submit_code safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Yaver, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For runner_auth_browser_submit_code, this is the rule to start with:
runner_auth_browser_submit_code stays usable, but rate-capped: a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Yaver, apply this rule, and every runner_auth_browser_submit_code call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about runner_auth_browser_submit_code
Submit a copied authentication code/token back into a running runner browser-auth session. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Yaver MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
runner_auth_browser_submit_code accepts 3 parameters: code, device_id, session_id. Required: code, session_id. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Yaver MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for runner_auth_browser_submit_code: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Yaver. Nothing to install.
runner_auth_browser_submit_code is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the runner_auth_browser_submit_code rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for runner_auth_browser_submit_code. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
runner_auth_browser_submit_code is provided by the Yaver MCP server (yaver-cli). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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