tmux_send_input
Send keyboard input to an adopted tmux session (e.g. type into a live Claude Code session running in a pane). The input is sent via tmux send-keys followed by Enter. Pass device_id to target a pane on another device.
This record as markdown: /tools/io-github-kivanccakmak-yaver/tmux-send-input.md
What tmux_send_input does on Yaver
AI agents invoke tmux_send_input to trigger actions in Yaver. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call: builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
input | string | Yes | The text to send to the tmux session |
task_id | string | Yes | The Yaver task ID of the adopted session |
device_id | string | — | Optional: target device whose daemon owns the tmux pane (omit for the local machine) |
allow_shell | boolean | — | Allow sending into a pane with NO coding agent running, where the text is EXECUTED as a shell command rather than read as a prompt. Defaults to false, which ref |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why tmux_send_input is rated High
Sends arbitrary keystrokes to a running session, executing any commands in that shell.
From the tool's definition Send keyboard input to a live tmux session via send-keys
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs tmux_send_input safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Yaver, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For tmux_send_input, this is the rule to start with:
tmux_send_input stays usable, but rate-capped: a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Yaver, apply this rule, and every tmux_send_input call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about tmux_send_input
Send keyboard input to an adopted tmux session (e.g. type into a live Claude Code session running in a pane). The input is sent via tmux send-keys followed by Enter. Pass device_id to target a pane on another device. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Yaver MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
tmux_send_input accepts 4 parameters: input, task_id, device_id, allow_shell. Required: input, task_id. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Yaver MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for tmux_send_input: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Yaver. Nothing to install.
tmux_send_input is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the tmux_send_input rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for tmux_send_input. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
tmux_send_input is provided by the Yaver MCP server (yaver-cli). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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