ccxt_fetch_withdrawals

Call exchange.fetchWithdrawals(code, since, limit, params).

SERVERCodex CCXT MCP SOURCEoci:ghcr.io/lucyfox199818-collab/ccxt-mcp:0.1.0

Low RISK CLASS

Category Read

Parameters 00 required

Recommended Allowedsee the rule below

Registry record Grade F, identity unverified Pull the record →

This record as markdown: /tools/io-github-lucyfox199818-collab-ccxt-mcp/ccxt-fetch-withdrawals.md

WHAT IT DOES

What ccxt_fetch_withdrawals does on Codex CCXT MCP

AI agents call ccxt_fetch_withdrawals to retrieve information from Codex CCXT MCP without modifying anything. It is typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.

RISK

Why ccxt_fetch_withdrawals is rated Low

This tool retrieves withdrawal history from an exchange account. It takes query parameters (code, since, limit, params) to filter withdrawal records. The 'fetch' prefix and the read-only nature of querying historical transaction data classify this as a Read operation. There are no side effects, no fund movements, and no state changes to the exchange or account.

From the tool's definition Tool name is 'ccxt_fetch_withdrawals' and description states 'Call exchange.fetchWithdrawals(code, since, limit, params)' — this is a fetch/retrieval operation that queries historical withdrawal data from an exchange without modifying, executing operations,…

Attacks that exploit this kind of access

RECOMMENDED RULE

The rule that runs ccxt_fetch_withdrawals safely

PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Codex CCXT MCP, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For ccxt_fetch_withdrawals, this is the rule to start with:

ccxt_fetch_withdrawals Allowed

ccxt_fetch_withdrawals is read-only, so it stays allowed. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.

View as policy code

policy.json

{
  "version": "1",
  "default": "deny",
  "tools": {
    "ccxt_fetch_withdrawals": {}
  }
}

ALLOW ONLY THIS TOOL → Instant setup, no code required.

The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Codex CCXT MCP, apply this rule, and every ccxt_fetch_withdrawals call is checked against it from then on.

FAQ

Questions about ccxt_fetch_withdrawals

What does the ccxt_fetch_withdrawals tool do? +

Call exchange.fetchWithdrawals(code, since, limit, params). It is categorised as a Read tool in the Codex CCXT MCP MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.

How do I enforce a policy on ccxt_fetch_withdrawals? +

Register the Codex CCXT MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for ccxt_fetch_withdrawals: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Codex CCXT MCP. Nothing to install.

What risk level is ccxt_fetch_withdrawals? +

ccxt_fetch_withdrawals is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.

Can I rate-limit ccxt_fetch_withdrawals? +

Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the ccxt_fetch_withdrawals rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.

How do I block ccxt_fetch_withdrawals completely? +

Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for ccxt_fetch_withdrawals. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.

What MCP server provides ccxt_fetch_withdrawals? +

ccxt_fetch_withdrawals is provided by the Codex CCXT MCP server (oci:ghcr.io/lucyfox199818-collab/ccxt-mcp:0.1.0). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.

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