managed_agent_list

SERVERClaude Flow SOURCEclaude-flow

Low RISK CLASS

Category Read

Parameters 00 required

Recommended Allowedsee the rule below

Registry record Grade F, identity unverified Pull the record →

This record as markdown: /tools/io-github-ruvnet-claude-flow/managed-agent-list.md

WHAT IT DOES

What managed_agent_list does on Claude Flow

AI agents call managed_agent_list to retrieve information from Claude Flow without modifying anything. It is typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.

RISK

Why managed_agent_list is rated Low

This is a read-only operation that queries and returns metadata about existing cloud-agent sessions. While the information revealed (billing status, running sessions) could be sensitive, the tool itself performs no destructive, modifying, or executing actions—it only retrieves and displays state.

From the tool's definition The tool description explicitly states it 'List[s] managed cloud-agent sessions' and retrieves information about 'id, status, title' with no modification capabilities.

Attacks that exploit this kind of access

RECOMMENDED RULE

The rule that runs managed_agent_list safely

PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Claude Flow, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For managed_agent_list, this is the rule to start with:

managed_agent_list Allowed

managed_agent_list is read-only, so it stays allowed. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.

View as policy code

policy.json

{
  "version": "1",
  "default": "deny",
  "tools": {
    "managed_agent_list": {}
  }
}

ALLOW ONLY THIS TOOL → Instant setup, no code required.

The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Claude Flow, apply this rule, and every managed_agent_list call is checked against it from then on.

FAQ

Questions about managed_agent_list

What does the managed_agent_list tool do? +

List managed cloud-agent sessions on this Anthropic org (id, status, title) — the CLOUD counterpart of wasm_agent_list. Use when native conversation memory is wrong because you need to see which cloud sessions exist (and which are still running / billing) across turns. For local WASM agents use wasm_agent_list. Pair with managed_agent_terminate to clean up idle sessions. It is categorised as a Read tool in the Claude Flow MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.

How do I enforce a policy on managed_agent_list? +

Register the Claude Flow MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for managed_agent_list: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Claude Flow. Nothing to install.

What risk level is managed_agent_list? +

managed_agent_list is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.

Can I rate-limit managed_agent_list? +

Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the managed_agent_list rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.

How do I block managed_agent_list completely? +

Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for managed_agent_list. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.

What MCP server provides managed_agent_list? +

managed_agent_list is provided by the Claude Flow MCP server (claude-flow). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.

KEEP EXPLORING

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