browser_drag
Drag one element onto another. source_ref is the element to grab; target_ref is where to drop. Both are CSS selectors. Used for slider captchas, kanban, drag-and-drop uploads.
This record as markdown: /tools/io-github-saloprj-dialogbrain/browser-drag.md
What browser_drag does on Dialogbrain
AI agents invoke browser_drag to trigger actions in Dialogbrain. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call: builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
page_id | string | Yes | |
source_ref | string | Yes | |
target_ref | string | Yes |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why browser_drag is rated High
This tool performs browser automation actions (drag-and-drop) that interact with live web elements. The effects depend entirely on the target context — could manipulate UI state, trigger uploads, or solve captchas. This is an Execute-category action since it runs browser operations whose consequences depend on arguments, with no indication of financial or destructive irreversibility in most cases.
From the tool's definition 'Drag one element onto another' using CSS selectors; 'Used for slider captchas, kanban, drag-and-drop uploads' — triggers browser UI interactions with external effects
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs browser_drag safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Dialogbrain, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For browser_drag, this is the rule to start with:
browser_drag stays usable, but rate-capped: a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Dialogbrain, apply this rule, and every browser_drag call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about browser_drag
Drag one element onto another. source_ref is the element to grab; target_ref is where to drop. Both are CSS selectors. Used for slider captchas, kanban, drag-and-drop uploads. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Dialogbrain MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
browser_drag accepts 3 parameters: page_id, source_ref, target_ref. Required: page_id, source_ref, target_ref. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Dialogbrain MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for browser_drag: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Dialogbrain. Nothing to install.
browser_drag is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the browser_drag rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for browser_drag. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
browser_drag is provided by the Dialogbrain MCP server (https://api.dialogbrain.com/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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