Build an unsigned Jito stake-pool deposit tx: deposit amountSol SOL into Jito's stake pool and receive jitoSOL (Jito's liquid-staking token). Uses the SPL stake-pool program's raw DepositSol instruction with the user's wallet as the on-chain fundingAccount — no ephemeral keypair, Ledger-compatibl...
AI agents call prepare_jito_stake to permanently remove resources in VaultPilot MCP — typically in cleanup and lifecycle workflows. It does its job in a single call, and there is no undo.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
wallet | string | Yes | Solana wallet that funds the deposit and receives jitoSOL. Must have an initialized durable-nonce account (prepare_solana_nonce_init) and enough SOL to cover th |
amountSol | string | Yes | Human-readable SOL amount to stake (e.g. "1.5"). Decimals are SOL-native (9 dec); the builder rounds down to lamport precision. |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
An AI agent that decides to call prepare_jito_stake doesn't hesitate, doesn't double-check, and doesn't stop at one. Whatever it removes from VaultPilot MCP is gone — there is no undo for destructive operations.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Build an unsigned Jito stake-pool deposit tx: deposit amountSol SOL into Jito's stake pool and receive jitoSOL (Jito's liquid-staking token). Uses the SPL stake-pool program's raw DepositSol instruction with the user's wallet as the on-chain fundingAccount — no ephemeral keypair, Ledger-compatible. The high-level @solana/spl-stake-pool helper would generate an ephemeral SOL-transfer keypair (incompatible with Ledger-only signing); we hand-build the ix to avoid that. The jitoSOL ATA is created automatically on first stake (~0.002 SOL ATA rent, reclaimable). DURABLE NONCE REQUIRED — wallet must have run prepare_solana_nonce_init first; otherwise this tool errors. BLIND-SIGN on Ledger (the SPL stake-pool program is not in the Solana app's clear-sign registry) — match the Message Hash on-device after preview_solana_send. Unstake (immediate via WithdrawSol or delayed via WithdrawStake) is not yet exposed; tracked as a follow-up. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the VaultPilot MCP MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
prepare_jito_stake accepts 2 parameters: wallet, amountSol. Required: wallet, amountSol. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the VaultPilot MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for prepare_jito_stake: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches VaultPilot MCP. Nothing to install.
prepare_jito_stake is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the prepare_jito_stake rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for prepare_jito_stake. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
prepare_jito_stake is provided by the VaultPilot MCP server (vaultpilot-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.