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send_transaction

Forward an already-prepared transaction to the Ledger device for user signing. Routes on the handle's origin: EVM handles (prepare_aave_*, prepare_compound_*, prepare_swap, prepare_native_send, ...) go through Ledger Live via WalletConnect; TRON handles (prepare_tron_*) go through the directly-co...

SERVERVaultPilot MCP SOURCEvaultpilot-mcp
Critical RISK CLASS
Category Financial
Parameters 52 required
Recommended Approval-gatedsee the rule below
Registry record Grade F, identity unverified Pull the record →

This record as markdown: /tools/io-github-szhygulin-vaultpilot-mcp/send-transaction.md

What send_transaction does on VaultPilot MCP

AI agents use send_transaction to commit financial operations through VaultPilot MCP, usually the final step of a payment, billing, or trading workflow. A call moves real money.

ParameterTypeRequiredDescription
handle string Yes Opaque handle returned by a prepare_* tool in the `handle` field of the UnsignedTx. Raw calldata is NOT accepted — the handle is the only way to name a tx for s
confirmed boolean Yes Must be literally `true`. The agent is affirming that the user has seen and acknowledged the decoded preview returned by the preceding prepare_* call. This is a
previewToken string Required for EVM and Solana (ignored for TRON — TRON has no preview step). Opaque token returned by the preceding `preview_send` (EVM) or `preview_solana_send`
userDecision string Required on every chain (EVM / Solana / TRON). The agent sets this to the literal "send" AFTER presenting the CHECKS PERFORMED block (EVM / Solana) or the VERIF
acknowledgeRetryRiskAfterAmbiguousFailure boolean Required ONLY when re-calling send_transaction on an EVM handle whose previous attempt returned a `WalletConnectRequestTimeoutError` (no_broadcast / consumed_un

Parameters from the server's own tool schema.

Why send_transaction is rated Critical

This tool submits signed blockchain transactions across multiple chains (EVM, TRON) including DeFi operations (Aave, Compound, swaps) and native sends. It moves crypto assets and commits financial obligations on-chain. Once broadcast, transactions are irreversible, making misuse catastrophic. The tool spans Financial (moving funds) and Destructive (irreversible), but Financial is the most severe applicable category.

From the tool's definition 'Forward an already-prepared transaction to the Ledger device for user signing', 'EVM handles (prepare_aave_*, prepare_compound_*, prepare_swap, prepare_native_send, ...) go through Ledger Live via WalletConnect', 'TRON handles ... are broadcast via TronGrid'

Questions about send_transaction

What does the send_transaction tool do? +

Forward an already-prepared transaction to the Ledger device for user signing. Routes on the handle's origin: EVM handles (prepare_aave_*, prepare_compound_*, prepare_swap, prepare_native_send, ...) go through Ledger Live via WalletConnect; TRON handles (prepare_tron_*) go through the directly-connected Ledger over USB HID and are broadcast via TronGrid. In both cases the user must review and physically approve the tx on the Ledger screen; this call blocks until the user signs or rejects. EVM handles REQUIRE a prior preview_send(handle) call in the same session — send_transaction reads the pinned nonce + fees + gas stashed on the handle and will throw a clear error if the pin is missing. The split exists so the LEDGER BLIND-SIGN HASH is surfaced to the user BEFORE the blocking device prompt. You MUST pass confirmed: true — the agent is affirming that the user has seen and acknowledged the decoded preview AND the LEDGER BLIND-SIGN HASH emitted by preview_send. EVM handles ADDITIONALLY require passing previewToken (the opaque string returned in preview_send's top-level JSON response) and userDecision: "send" (set after the user has replied "send" to the EXTRA CHECKS menu emitted by preview_send's agent-task block). Together these prove the agent actually surfaced the preview-time gate to the user instead of collapsing preview_send + send_transaction into one silent step — missing/mismatched values cause a clear-error refusal. TRON handles ignore both args. For TRON handles, pair_ledger_tron must have been called at least once per session (so the TRON app has been opened on the device) and the Ledger must still be plugged in with the TRON app open at send time; preview_send is skipped (TRON has its own clear-sign UX on-device). It is categorised as a Financial tool in the VaultPilot MCP MCP Server, which means it involves financial transactions. Block by default and require explicit approval.

What parameters does send_transaction accept? +

send_transaction accepts 5 parameters: handle, confirmed, previewToken, userDecision, acknowledgeRetryRiskAfterAmbiguousFailure. Required: handle, confirmed. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.

How do I enforce a policy on send_transaction? +

Register the VaultPilot MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for send_transaction: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches VaultPilot MCP. Nothing to install.

What risk level is send_transaction? +

send_transaction is a Financial tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.

Can I rate-limit send_transaction? +

Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the send_transaction rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.

How do I block send_transaction completely? +

Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for send_transaction. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.

What MCP server provides send_transaction? +

send_transaction is provided by the VaultPilot MCP server (vaultpilot-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.

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