Sign a UTF-8 message with a paired Litecoin address using the BIP-137 compact-signature scheme (with Litecoin's \x19Litecoin Signed Message:\n prefix). Returns the signature plus messageSha256 — lowercase hex SHA-256 of the exact UTF-8 bytes submitted to the device (Inv #8 byte-fingerprint, issue...
AI agents call sign_message_ltc to permanently remove resources in VaultPilot MCP — typically in cleanup and lifecycle workflows. It does its job in a single call, and there is no undo.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
wallet | string | Yes | Paired Litecoin source address. Must already be in `pairings.litecoin`. Taproot (`ltc1p...`) is refused — BIP-322 is not yet exposed by the Ledger Litecoin app. |
message | string | Yes | UTF-8 message to sign. |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
An AI agent that decides to call sign_message_ltc doesn't hesitate, doesn't double-check, and doesn't stop at one. Whatever it removes from VaultPilot MCP is gone — there is no undo for destructive operations.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Sign a UTF-8 message with a paired Litecoin address using the BIP-137 compact-signature scheme (with Litecoin's \x19Litecoin Signed Message:\n prefix). Returns the signature plus messageSha256 — lowercase hex SHA-256 of the exact UTF-8 bytes submitted to the device (Inv #8 byte-fingerprint, issue #454); surface in the verbatim block so the user can recompute on a separate device. Same on-device clear-sign UX as sign_message_btc. DRAINER-STRING REFUSAL (issue #454): refuses messages containing value-transfer / authorization markers or explicit drainer templates BEFORE any device interaction — same allowlist as sign_message_btc. Taproot (ltc1p…) is refused — BIP-322 isn't exposed by the Ledger Litecoin app. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the VaultPilot MCP MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
sign_message_ltc accepts 2 parameters: wallet, message. Required: wallet, message. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the VaultPilot MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for sign_message_ltc: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches VaultPilot MCP. Nothing to install.
sign_message_ltc is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the sign_message_ltc rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for sign_message_ltc. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
sign_message_ltc is provided by the VaultPilot MCP server (vaultpilot-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.