tmux_send_command
AI agents invoke tmux_send_command to trigger actions in TmuxControlLib MCP Server. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
The tool name strongly implies sending commands to a tmux session/pane, which executes arbitrary shell commands in a terminal. This is one of the most dangerous capabilities possible — an AI agent could run any shell command on the host system. The description is empty, which lowers confidence slightly, but the name and server context make the Execute classification nearly certain.
From the tool's definition Tool name 'tmux_send_command' on a server designed to 'control tmux sessions' and 'manage windows and panes'
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
tmux_send_command. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the TmuxControlLib MCP Server MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the TmuxControlLib MCP Server MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for tmux_send_command: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches TmuxControlLib MCP Server. Nothing to install.
tmux_send_command is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the tmux_send_command rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for tmux_send_command. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
tmux_send_command is provided by the TmuxControlLib MCP Server MCP server (jbwinters/tmuxcontrollib). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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