AI agents invoke send_input to trigger actions in Zmachine. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
Sending input to a Z-Machine session executes interpreter commands that mutate game state (inventory, world state, progression). While the blast radius is contained to a game session, it is an active execution of commands with state-changing side effects rather than a simple read. It is not destructive in the irreversible real-world sense, but it does drive external process execution.
From the tool's definition "Send a text command to an active game session and get the response" — triggers execution of commands within the Z-Machine interpreter, producing side effects within the game state.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Send a text command to an active game session and get the response. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Zmachine MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the Zmachine MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for send_input: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Zmachine. Nothing to install.
send_input is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the send_input rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for send_input. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
send_input is provided by the Zmachine MCP server (jonathan-meyer/zmachine-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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