schedule_dispatch
AI agents invoke schedule_dispatch to trigger actions in Claude Bridge. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
The tool name 'schedule_dispatch' combined with the server context (dispatching work/code execution into a devcontainer) strongly implies it schedules future execution of arbitrary operations. This falls under Execute since it triggers external operations. The description is empty, which lowers confidence, but sibling tools like 'cancel_schedule' confirm scheduling functionality.
From the tool's definition Tool name 'schedule_dispatch' on a server designed to 'dispatch work into Claude Code running inside your devcontainer over stdio'; sibling tools include 'dispatch', 'dispatch_async', 'cancel_dispatch', 'cancel_schedule' suggesting scheduled execution of…
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
schedule_dispatch. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Claude Bridge MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the Claude Bridge MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for schedule_dispatch: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Claude Bridge. Nothing to install.
schedule_dispatch is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the schedule_dispatch rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for schedule_dispatch. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
schedule_dispatch is provided by the Claude Bridge MCP server (josiahsiegel/claude-bridge). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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