wait_dispatch
AI agents invoke wait_dispatch to trigger actions in Claude Bridge. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
The tool's name 'wait_dispatch' combined with its position among dispatch-related tools suggests it blocks/waits for results from previously dispatched work (via 'dispatch' or 'dispatch_async'). Since the server explicitly executes arbitrary 'work' and 'Claude Code' in a devcontainer, waiting on such results constitutes triggering/observing the effects of external code execution. This is Execute-category behavior.
From the tool's definition Tool is part of a server that 'dispatch[es] work into Claude Code running inside your devcontainer' with sibling tools named 'dispatch', 'dispatch_async', and 'get_dispatch', indicating this tool waits for execution results from arbitrary code running in a…
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
wait_dispatch. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Claude Bridge MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the Claude Bridge MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for wait_dispatch: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Claude Bridge. Nothing to install.
wait_dispatch is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the wait_dispatch rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for wait_dispatch. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
wait_dispatch is provided by the Claude Bridge MCP server (josiahsiegel/claude-bridge). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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