Send a direct message to another Codex peer by peer id.
AI agents use send_message to create or update resources in Codex Peers MCP — usually the action step of a workflow, after the agent has gathered context. Every call changes real data in your Codex Peers MCP environment.
This is classified as Write rather than Execute because the tool itself sends a message (creates/modifies data in a message queue), not directly executing code. However, the severity is elevated to medium because messages between AI agents could potentially be crafted to manipulate other sessions into performing unintended actions, creating a coordination/injection risk.
From the tool's definition The tool 'send_message' enables sending direct messages to another Codex peer. While the description does not explicitly detail what constitutes the message payload or whether messages can trigger actions on the recipient, the ability to send arbitrary…
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Send a direct message to another Codex peer by peer id. It is categorised as a Write tool in the Codex Peers MCP MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
Register the Codex Peers MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for send_message: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Codex Peers MCP. Nothing to install.
send_message is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the send_message rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for send_message. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
send_message is provided by the Codex Peers MCP server (jscianna/codex-peers-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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