Run an active catalog tool by name using manifest-driven argv construction.
AI agents invoke catalog_run_tool to trigger actions in tin-canMCP. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
This is a meta-execution tool that dynamically invokes other tools on the MCP server. It functions as a dispatcher or executor that triggers external operations (other catalog tools) based on runtime parameters. The effects are not predetermined and depend on the arguments and target tool selected, making it Execute rather than Write.
From the tool's definition 'Run an active catalog tool by name using manifest-driven argv construction' — the tool executes arbitrary catalog tools with dynamically constructed arguments, enabling execution of operations whose effects depend entirely on which tool is invoked and what…
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Run an active catalog tool by name using manifest-driven argv construction. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the tin-canMCP MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the tin-can MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for catalog_run_tool: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches tin-canMCP. Nothing to install.
catalog_run_tool is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the catalog_run_tool rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for catalog_run_tool. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
catalog_run_tool is provided by the tin-can MCP server (juangrukat/tin-canmcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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