Create a signed attestation linking a per-app handle (e.g., @alice@m.example on Mastodon) to this Crow root identity. The signature can be verified by remote parties via /.well-known/crow-identity.json. OFF BY DEFAULT — opt-in per-handle; publication is permanent and can only be retracted via sig...
AI agents use crow_identity_attest to create or update resources in Crow — usually the action step of a workflow, after the agent has gathered context. Every call changes real data in your Crow environment.
This tool creates and publishes identity attestations that are cryptographically signed and discoverable via /.well-known/crow-identity.json. While revocation is possible, it is also permanent/public. The action is Write-class because it establishes new data (signed attestations) with reversible semantics (revocation is supported).
From the tool's definition Creates a signed attestation linking handles to identity; publication is permanent (reversible only via signed revocation); establishes cryptographic bindings that other parties will rely on.
Risk signalsAdmin/system-level operation
Documented attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access crow_identity_attest gives an agent:
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway — it sits between your AI agents and Crow, and nothing reaches the server without passing your rules. This is the rule we recommend for crow_identity_attest:
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"tools": {
"crow_identity_attest": {
"limits": [
{
"counter": "crow_identity_attest_rate",
"window": "minute",
"max": 30,
"scope": "grant"
}
]
}
}
}crow_identity_attest stays usable, but capped — an agent stuck in a loop can't make hundreds of changes a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
Free to start. No card required.
Create a signed attestation linking a per-app handle (e.g., @alice@m.example on Mastodon) to this Crow root identity. The signature can be verified by remote parties via /.well-known/crow-identity.json. OFF BY DEFAULT — opt-in per-handle; publication is permanent and can only be retracted via signed revocation (which itself is public). It is categorised as a Write tool in the Crow MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
Register the Crow MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for crow_identity_attest: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Crow. Nothing to install.
crow_identity_attest is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the crow_identity_attest rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for crow_identity_attest. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
crow_identity_attest is provided by the Crow MCP server (kh0pper/crow). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Start from Crow, add the rest of your stack, and see everything your agents can call. Then put policy on all of it.
Free to start. No card required.
576 Crow tools catalogued and risk-classified — across an index of 43,000+ MCP servers.