Delete a reading date entry by its ID. This cannot be undone.
AI agents call delete_user_book_read to permanently remove resources in Hardcover — typically in cleanup and lifecycle workflows. It does its job in a single call, and there is no undo.
The tool permanently removes a reading date entry with no undo capability. Although it only affects user metadata rather than core data integrity, the irreversible deletion of personal reading history records makes this Destructive rather than Write. Medium severity reflects that the blast radius is limited to a single user's reading log entries, not financial or system-critical data.
From the tool's definition Tool name is 'delete_user_book_read' and description explicitly states 'This cannot be undone.' This is an irreversible deletion operation on user reading history data.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Delete a reading date entry by its ID. This cannot be undone. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the Hardcover MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the Hardcover MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for delete_user_book_read: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Hardcover. Nothing to install.
delete_user_book_read is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the delete_user_book_read rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for delete_user_book_read. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
delete_user_book_read is provided by the Hardcover MCP server (kristianedlund/hardcover-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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