Navigate the replay to a specific event ID. This must be called before inspecting pipeline state, shader bindings, etc. Subsequent queries will reflect the state at this event. Args: event_id: The event ID to navigate to.
AI agents invoke set_event to trigger actions in Renderdoc. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
This tool actively changes the state of the RenderDoc replay session by navigating to a specific event, which affects all subsequent operations. It's not a pure read (it modifies session state), not destructive or financial, but it does trigger an external operation whose effects depend on the argument (event_id). Execute is the most appropriate category.
From the tool's definition 'Navigate the replay to a specific event ID' and 'Subsequent queries will reflect the state at this event' — triggers an external operation (replaying/seeking in a RenderDoc capture session) that changes the state of the replay context
Documented attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access set_event gives an agent:
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway — it sits between your AI agents and Renderdoc, and nothing reaches the server without passing your rules. This is the rule we recommend for set_event:
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"tools": {
"set_event": {
"limits": [
{
"counter": "set_event_rate",
"window": "minute",
"max": 10,
"scope": "grant"
}
]
}
}
}set_event stays usable, but rate-capped — a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
Free to start. No card required.
Navigate the replay to a specific event ID. This must be called before inspecting pipeline state, shader bindings, etc. Subsequent queries will reflect the state at this event. Args: event_id: The event ID to navigate to. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Renderdoc MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the Renderdoc MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for set_event: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Renderdoc. Nothing to install.
set_event is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the set_event rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for set_event. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
set_event is provided by the Renderdoc MCP server (linkingooo/renderdoc-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Start from Renderdoc, add the rest of your stack, and see everything your agents can call. Then put policy on all of it.
Free to start. No card required.
42 Renderdoc tools catalogued and risk-classified — across an index of 43,000+ MCP servers.