AI agents invoke run_command to trigger actions in Iterm2. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
This tool executes arbitrary shell commands in iTerm2 sessions. Command execution is inherently Execute-category because effects depend entirely on argument content (user could run rm -rf /, curl malicious scripts, exfiltrate data, etc.). Blast radius is critical on a macOS system with full terminal access. Malicious use could compromise the entire machine.
From the tool's definition Tool named 'run_command' on a terminal control server (iterm2-mcp) that 'provides full control over iTerm2 terminal sessions' and 'enable[s] users to manage windows, tabs, and panes, run commands.' The sibling tools ('create_tab', 'create_window',…
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
run_command. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Iterm2 MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the Iterm2 MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for run_command: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Iterm2. Nothing to install.
run_command is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the run_command rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for run_command. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
run_command is provided by the Iterm2 MCP server (lorencarvalho/iterm2-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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