【远程操作】Git 远程仓库管理。action 支持：list(列表)/add(添加)/remove(移除)/get-url(获取URL)。
AI agents call git_remote to permanently remove resources in LuzzyTool — typically in cleanup and lifecycle workflows. It does its job in a single call, and there is no undo.
An AI agent that decides to call git_remote doesn't hesitate, doesn't double-check, and doesn't stop at one. Whatever it removes from LuzzyTool is gone — there is no undo for destructive operations.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
【远程操作】Git 远程仓库管理。action 支持：list(列表)/add(添加)/remove(移除)/get-url(获取URL)。. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the LuzzyTool MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the LuzzyTool MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for git_remote: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches LuzzyTool. Nothing to install.
git_remote is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the git_remote rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for git_remote. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
git_remote is provided by the LuzzyTool MCP server (luzzymeow/luzzytool). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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