AI agents call play_done_sound as a supporting operation in Datetime workflows.
Based on the tool name and server context, this tool likely plays an audio sound as a notification, which is a benign side-effect with no data read/write, execution of code, destructive action, or financial implication. However, confidence is low due to the empty description.
From the tool's definition Tool name is 'play_done_sound'; description is empty. Server context mentions datetime functionality and a sibling tool 'play_confirmation_sound', suggesting audio notification behavior.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
play_done_sound. It is categorised as a Other tool in the Datetime MCP Server, which means it performs auxiliary operations.
Register the Datetime MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for play_done_sound: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Datetime. Nothing to install.
play_done_sound is a Other tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the play_done_sound rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for play_done_sound. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
play_done_sound is provided by the Datetime MCP server (mamisoa/mcp-server). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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