Stop the orchestrator daemon. Running tasks finish before exit.
AI agents invoke orchestrator_stop to trigger actions in ScreenHand. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
This tool triggers an external operation (daemon termination) whose effects are significant but not irreversible—the daemon can be restarted. It does not delete or corrupt data (not Destructive), and does not move money (not Financial). However, it executes a command that fundamentally changes system state and disrupts active automation workflows, making it Execute rather than Write.
From the tool's definition Stop the orchestrator daemon. This terminates a critical system process that manages high-speed native UI actions, browser sessions, and automation workflows.
Documented attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access orchestrator_stop gives an agent:
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway — it sits between your AI agents and ScreenHand, and nothing reaches the server without passing your rules. This is the rule we recommend for orchestrator_stop:
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"tools": {
"orchestrator_stop": {
"limits": [
{
"counter": "orchestrator_stop_rate",
"window": "minute",
"max": 10,
"scope": "grant"
}
]
}
}
}orchestrator_stop stays usable, but rate-capped — a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
Free to start. No card required.
Stop the orchestrator daemon. Running tasks finish before exit. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the ScreenHand MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the ScreenHand MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for orchestrator_stop: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches ScreenHand. Nothing to install.
orchestrator_stop is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the orchestrator_stop rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for orchestrator_stop. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
orchestrator_stop is provided by the ScreenHand MCP server (manushi4/screenhand). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Start from ScreenHand, add the rest of your stack, and see everything your agents can call. Then put policy on all of it.
Free to start. No card required.
89 ScreenHand tools catalogued and risk-classified — across an index of 43,000+ MCP servers.