AI agents call slack_schedule_message as a supporting operation in Mcp Gmail workflows.
The description is entirely empty, which makes it impossible to confirm what this tool does. The tool name suggests scheduling a Slack message (a Write action), but it appears on a Gmail server alongside GitHub-related sibling tools, indicating a poorly documented or miscategorized server. Confidence is very low.
From the tool's definition Tool name is 'slack_schedule_message' but description is empty; the server is described as a Gmail MCP server, making this tool's presence and purpose ambiguous.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
slack_schedule_message. It is categorised as a Other tool in the Mcp Gmail MCP Server, which means it performs auxiliary operations.
Register the Mcp Gmail MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for slack_schedule_message: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Mcp Gmail. Nothing to install.
slack_schedule_message is a Other tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the slack_schedule_message rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for slack_schedule_message. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
slack_schedule_message is provided by the Mcp Gmail MCP server (@monsoft/mcp-gmail). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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