Delete a tag. All object attachments will be removed.
AI agents call superset_tag_delete to permanently remove resources in MCP Superset — typically in cleanup and lifecycle workflows. It does its job in a single call, and there is no undo.
The tool performs an irreversible deletion of a tag and severs all associated object attachments. This is a destructive operation with potential blast radius — an AI agent misusing this could permanently remove important organizational metadata and break relationships between objects and tags, requiring administrative intervention to restore. Destructive category is more severe than Write, so it takes precedence.
From the tool's definition Tool name contains 'delete' and description states 'Delete a tag. All object attachments will be removed.' This is an irreversible deletion operation that removes data (tag and its attachments) that cannot be recovered without external restoration.
Documented attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access superset_tag_delete gives an agent:
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway — it sits between your AI agents and MCP Superset, and nothing reaches the server without passing your rules. This is the rule we recommend for superset_tag_delete:
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"hide": [
"superset_tag_delete"
]
}superset_tag_delete disappears from the agent's tool list entirely, and any attempt to call it is denied. The rest of the server keeps working.
Free to start. No card required.
Delete a tag. All object attachments will be removed. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the MCP Superset MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the MCP Superset MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for superset_tag_delete: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches MCP Superset. Nothing to install.
superset_tag_delete is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the superset_tag_delete rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for superset_tag_delete. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
superset_tag_delete is provided by the MCP Superset MCP server (mcp-superset). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Start from MCP Superset, add the rest of your stack, and see everything your agents can call. Then put policy on all of it.
Free to start. No card required.
137 MCP Superset tools catalogued and risk-classified — across an index of 43,000+ MCP servers.