request_user_input
AI agents invoke request_user_input to trigger actions in Interactive. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
request_user_input triggers real processes with real consequences. An agent gone sideways doesn't fire it once — it starts dozens of builds, sends mass notifications, or burns through compute before anyone looks up.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
request_user_input. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Interactive MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the Interactive MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for request_user_input: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Interactive. Nothing to install.
request_user_input is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the request_user_input rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for request_user_input. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
request_user_input is provided by the Interactive MCP server (mikeysrecipes/interactive-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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