list_vm_usage_history

List virtual machine usage history

SERVERCloudStack MCP Server SOURCEmozg31337/cloudstack-mcp-server

Low RISK CLASS

Category Read

Parameters 00 required

Recommended Allowedsee the rule below

Registry record Grade F, identity unverified Pull the record →

This record as markdown: /tools/mozg31337-cloudstack-mcp-server/list-vm-usage-history.md

WHAT IT DOES

What list_vm_usage_history does on CloudStack MCP Server

AI agents call list_vm_usage_history to retrieve information from CloudStack MCP Server without modifying anything. It is typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.

RISK

Why list_vm_usage_history is rated Low

This tool retrieves virtual machine usage history without any side effects. It queries existing data to provide metrics or logs about VM usage patterns. There is no capability to modify, delete, execute code, or affect infrastructure state. This is a straightforward Read operation with minimal risk if accessed by an AI agent.

From the tool's definition Tool name and description indicate retrieval of historical usage data: 'list' and 'usage history' are read-only query operations with no modification, deletion, or execution capabilities.

Attacks that exploit this kind of access

RECOMMENDED RULE

The rule that runs list_vm_usage_history safely

PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and CloudStack MCP Server, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For list_vm_usage_history, this is the rule to start with:

list_vm_usage_history Allowed

list_vm_usage_history is read-only, so it stays allowed. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.

View as policy code

policy.json

{
  "version": "1",
  "default": "deny",
  "tools": {
    "list_vm_usage_history": {}
  }
}

ALLOW ONLY THIS TOOL → Instant setup, no code required.

The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect CloudStack MCP Server, apply this rule, and every list_vm_usage_history call is checked against it from then on.

FAQ

Questions about list_vm_usage_history

What does the list_vm_usage_history tool do? +

List virtual machine usage history. It is categorised as a Read tool in the CloudStack MCP Server MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.

How do I enforce a policy on list_vm_usage_history? +

Register the CloudStack MCP Server MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for list_vm_usage_history: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches CloudStack MCP Server. Nothing to install.

What risk level is list_vm_usage_history? +

list_vm_usage_history is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.

Can I rate-limit list_vm_usage_history? +

Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the list_vm_usage_history rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.

How do I block list_vm_usage_history completely? +

Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for list_vm_usage_history. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.

What MCP server provides list_vm_usage_history? +

list_vm_usage_history is provided by the CloudStack MCP Server MCP server (mozg31337/cloudstack-mcp-server). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.

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