Delete a custom field
AI agents call planka_delete_custom_field to permanently remove resources in Planka MCP Server for Claude — typically in cleanup and lifecycle workflows. It does its job in a single call, and there is no undo.
Deletion of custom fields cannot be undone and affects all cards using that field. While the blast radius is scoped to schema metadata rather than bulk card data, the irreversible nature and potential for cascading side effects (orphaned field references, data loss for dependent cards) justify 'Destructive' classification over 'Write'.
From the tool's definition Tool name contains 'delete' and description states 'Delete a custom field' — this irreversibly removes data from the Planka system.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Delete a custom field. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the Planka MCP Server for Claude MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the Planka MCP Server for Claude MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for planka_delete_custom_field: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Planka MCP Server for Claude. Nothing to install.
planka_delete_custom_field is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the planka_delete_custom_field rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for planka_delete_custom_field. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
planka_delete_custom_field is provided by the Planka MCP Server for Claude MCP server (nextheberg/planka-mcp-server-for-claude). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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