Start a long-running process; returns immediately; logs stream to pipe-pane file
AI agents invoke start_process to trigger actions in Terminally MCP. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
This tool runs external processes/code execution, making it an Execute category risk. Severity is high because even in an isolated tmux environment, a malicious AI agent could execute harmful commands (resource exhaustion, data exfiltration from the sandbox, or lateral attacks). The 'returns immediately' behavior combined with 'logs stream' suggests async execution that could be harder to monitor.
From the tool's definition The tool 'start_process' executes commands in a terminal environment ('long-running process'), with effects determined entirely by the command argument.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Start a long-running process; returns immediately; logs stream to pipe-pane file. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Terminally MCP MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the Terminally MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for start_process: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Terminally MCP. Nothing to install.
start_process is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the start_process rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for start_process. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
start_process is provided by the Terminally MCP server (nighttrek/terminally-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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