Simulates typing the given text input into the currently focused field on the connected Android device. Requires the text parameter, which is the string to be typed.
AI agents invoke input_text to trigger actions in Ultimate Android MCP. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
This tool triggers an external operation on a physical/virtual Android device by injecting keystrokes into the currently focused input field. It can submit forms, enter credentials, send messages, or trigger other UI actions depending on context.
From the tool's definition 'Simulates typing the given text input into the currently focused field on the connected Android device'
Documented attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access input_text gives an agent:
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway — it sits between your AI agents and Ultimate Android MCP, and nothing reaches the server without passing your rules. This is the rule we recommend for input_text:
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"tools": {
"input_text": {
"limits": [
{
"counter": "input_text_rate",
"window": "minute",
"max": 10,
"scope": "grant"
}
]
}
}
}input_text stays usable, but rate-capped — a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
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Simulates typing the given text input into the currently focused field on the connected Android device. Requires the text parameter, which is the string to be typed. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Ultimate Android MCP MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the Ultimate Android MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for input_text: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Ultimate Android MCP. Nothing to install.
input_text is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the input_text rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for input_text. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
input_text is provided by the Ultimate Android MCP server (oddlyspaced/ultimate-android-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Start from Ultimate Android MCP, add the rest of your stack, and see everything your agents can call. Then put policy on all of it.
Free to start. No card required.
35 Ultimate Android MCP tools catalogued and risk-classified — across an index of 43,000+ MCP servers.