AI agents use select_page to create or update resources in Electron — usually the action step of a workflow, after the agent has gathered context. Every call changes real data in your Electron environment.
An AI agent can call select_page faster than any human can review — one bad instruction and it creates or modifies resources in Electron by the hundred, each call as confident as the last.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Select the page that will be the context for subsequent tool calls. pageId from list_pages. It is categorised as a Write tool in the Electron MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
Register the Electron MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for select_page: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Electron. Nothing to install.
select_page is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the select_page rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for select_page. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
select_page is provided by the Electron MCP server (ohah/electron-mcp-server). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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