Returns the invite graph for the caller
AI agents call family_tree to retrieve information from Old Family Recipe without modifying anything — typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.
This tool retrieves and returns data (the invite/family graph) without modifying anything. It is a pure read operation with low blast radius — the worst outcome of misuse is disclosure of family membership information.
From the tool's definition Returns the invite graph for the caller
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Returns the invite graph for the caller. It is categorised as a Read tool in the Old Family Recipe MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.
Register the Old Family Recipe MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for family_tree: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Old Family Recipe. Nothing to install.
family_tree is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the family_tree rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for family_tree. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
family_tree is provided by the Old Family Recipe MCP server (oldfamilyrecipe/ai). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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