Open the OS file manager with the given file selected (macOS: Finder → Reveal; Windows: Explorer → select; Linux: opens the enclosing folder). Used by the viewer to surface the active PDF or its backup so the user can immediately see the relevant file.
AI agents invoke reveal_in_finder to trigger actions in PDF Tools. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
This tool triggers an external OS-level operation (launching/focusing the file manager application) rather than simply reading or writing data. It executes a system action to open Finder/Explorer and reveal a file. While the blast radius is low (it only opens a UI window), it is an external operation execution, not a passive read.
From the tool's definition Open the OS file manager with the given file selected... macOS: Finder → Reveal; Windows: Explorer → select; Linux: opens the enclosing folder
Documented attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access reveal_in_finder gives an agent:
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway — it sits between your AI agents and PDF Tools, and nothing reaches the server without passing your rules. This is the rule we recommend for reveal_in_finder:
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"tools": {
"reveal_in_finder": {
"limits": [
{
"counter": "reveal_in_finder_rate",
"window": "minute",
"max": 10,
"scope": "grant"
}
]
}
}
} reveal_in_finder stays usable, but rate-capped — a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
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Open the OS file manager with the given file selected (macOS: Finder → Reveal; Windows: Explorer → select; Linux: opens the enclosing folder). Used by the viewer to surface the active PDF or its backup so the user can immediately see the relevant file. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the PDF Tools MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the PDF Tools MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for reveal_in_finder: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches PDF Tools. Nothing to install.
reveal_in_finder is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the reveal_in_finder rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for reveal_in_finder. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
reveal_in_finder is provided by the PDF Tools MCP server (open-document-alliance/pdf-tools). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Deterministic rules across all 36 PDF Tools tools. Per-identity grants. Full audit log. Live in minutes. Nothing to install.
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36 PDF Tools tools catalogued and risk-classified — across an index of 42,500+ MCP servers.