AI agents call ovh_get_user_info to retrieve information from Ovh without modifying anything — typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.
This is a read-only query that retrieves user profile or account information from OVH. It has no capability to modify, delete, or execute operations. The blast radius if misused by an AI agent is minimal—it only exposes user metadata.
From the tool's definition Tool name 'ovh_get_user_info' and description 'Get current user information' indicate a retrieval operation with no modification or side effects.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Get current user information. It is categorised as a Read tool in the Ovh MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.
Register the Ovh MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for ovh_get_user_info: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Ovh. Nothing to install.
ovh_get_user_info is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the ovh_get_user_info rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for ovh_get_user_info. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
ovh_get_user_info is provided by the Ovh MCP server (mcp-server-ovh). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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