Run
AI agents invoke pull_engine_image to trigger actions in PineForge-Codegen. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
This tool triggers execution of Docker operations that download and load container images. While not destructive in isolation, this is an Execute-class action because it invokes external processes whose effects depend on runtime conditions (network state, image availability, container startup).
From the tool's definition The description states the tool will 'Run' and based on server context, it executes Docker operations to pull and initialize the PineForge engine image, which is an external system operation with side effects (downloading and staging container images).
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Run. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the PineForge-Codegen MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the PineForge-Codegen MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for pull_engine_image: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches PineForge-Codegen. Nothing to install.
pull_engine_image is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the pull_engine_image rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for pull_engine_image. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
pull_engine_image is provided by the PineForge-Codegen MCP server (oci:ghcr.io/pineforge-4pass/pineforge-codegen-mcp:v0.9.2). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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