authorize_payment_against_mandate
Mandate Authorization Gate: OpenChainGraph compute node (payment_mandate). Deterministic OpenChainGraph compute node. By default (compute:"auto") inputs are computed server-side on Cloudflare Workers for gpu:false nodes with a registered kernel; compute:"browser" forces client-side execution and ...
This record as markdown: /tools/postoaklabs-ainumbers-mcp-apps/authorize-payment-against-mandate.md
What authorize_payment_against_mandate does on Ainumbers Mcp Apps
AI agents call authorize_payment_against_mandate to retrieve information from Ainumbers Mcp Apps without modifying anything. It is typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
compute | string | — | Compute mode (v0.4 Compute Binding). "auto" (default) = server for gpu:false nodes with registered kernels; "server" = force server-side; "browser" = always ret |
parent_hashes | array | — | execution_hash values from upstream ChainGraph AP2 artifacts to chain from (sets chain.parent_hashes in the export). |
parent_tool_ids | array | — | tool_id values matching parent_hashes, in the same order. |
policy_parameters | object | — | Input parameters for this tool's decision function. For gpu:false nodes with a registered kernel, these are computed server-side when compute is "auto" or "serv |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why authorize_payment_against_mandate is rated Low
Even though authorize_payment_against_mandate only reads data, uncontrolled read access leaks sensitive information and racks up API costs: an agent caught in a retry loop can make thousands of calls a minute without anyone noticing.
Risk signalsHigh parameter count (11 properties) · Bulk/mass operation — affects multiple targets
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs authorize_payment_against_mandate safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Ainumbers Mcp Apps, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For authorize_payment_against_mandate, this is the rule to start with:
authorize_payment_against_mandate is read-only, so it stays allowed. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Ainumbers Mcp Apps, apply this rule, and every authorize_payment_against_mandate call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about authorize_payment_against_mandate
Mandate Authorization Gate: OpenChainGraph compute node (payment_mandate). Deterministic OpenChainGraph compute node. By default (compute:"auto") inputs are computed server-side on Cloudflare Workers for gpu:false nodes with a registered kernel; compute:"browser" forces client-side execution and returns a browser delegation URL instead. gpu:true nodes always delegate to the browser. Inputs are processed transiently to compute the response and are not stored, logged, or retained. Use synthetic or anonymised inputs only. Exports an AP2 artifact with execution_hash for chain provenance. Consumes upstream artifacts from: art-476-map-agent-payment-mandate. Open at: https://ainumbers.co/chaingraph/art-703-mandate-authorization-gate.html FV-status (published/proven/still-trusted for this spec): /fv-status/565f2dd45a55e0ff0f8dafde8c1080f9e1484b32a5aaa96f4d7739a236b9258a.json — a snapshot, not a subscription; this receipt verifies offline regardless of whether that file is ever fetched. Summary: Automated payment approval gate with no human step: a fixed ten-rule mandate check lists every failing rule with a named reason, issues a one-use authorization bound to the exact request digest with a window clipped to the mandate expiry, and re-verifies the committed request at commit time. Outputs: authorization, authorization_id, decision, domain_errors, mode, primary_reason, reasons, remaining_budget_minor, scope_note. Output schema: call describe_tool("authorize_payment_against_mandate"). It is categorised as a Read tool in the Ainumbers Mcp Apps MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.
authorize_payment_against_mandate accepts 4 parameters: compute, parent_hashes, parent_tool_ids, policy_parameters. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Ainumbers Mcp Apps MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for authorize_payment_against_mandate: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Ainumbers Mcp Apps. Nothing to install.
authorize_payment_against_mandate is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the authorize_payment_against_mandate rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for authorize_payment_against_mandate. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
authorize_payment_against_mandate is provided by the Ainumbers Mcp Apps MCP server (postoaklabs/ainumbers-mcp-apps). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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