Spawn a long-running background process and return its PID and log paths. Note: Use this for helper services. Do not use this to run the target binary under analysis. Use set_file + run (or attach) for debugger workflows. Use pwncli for exploit interaction. Args: command: Shell command to spawn. ...
AI agents invoke spawn_process to trigger actions in Pwno. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
This tool directly executes shell commands with arbitrary arguments (command parameter), which is characteristic of Execute category tools. While it's intended for 'helper services' rather than target binaries, the capability to spawn any long-running background process via shell commands gives an agent significant power to trigger external operations.
From the tool's definition Tool description states 'Spawn a long-running background process and return its PID and log paths' with an argument for arbitrary 'Shell command to spawn.' This enables execution of arbitrary shell commands.
Documented attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access spawn_process gives an agent:
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway — it sits between your AI agents and Pwno, and nothing reaches the server without passing your rules. This is the rule we recommend for spawn_process:
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"tools": {
"spawn_process": {
"limits": [
{
"counter": "spawn_process_rate",
"window": "minute",
"max": 10,
"scope": "grant"
}
]
}
}
}spawn_process stays usable, but rate-capped — a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
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Spawn a long-running background process and return its PID and log paths. Note: Use this for helper services. Do not use this to run the target binary under analysis. Use set_file + run (or attach) for debugger workflows. Use pwncli for exploit interaction. Args: command: Shell command to spawn. cwd: Working directory (defaults to /workspace). Use a container-visible path under /workspace; relative paths resolve under /workspace. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Pwno MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the Pwno MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for spawn_process: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Pwno. Nothing to install.
spawn_process is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the spawn_process rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for spawn_process. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
spawn_process is provided by the Pwno MCP server (pwno-io/pwno-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Deterministic rules across all 36 Pwno tools. Per-identity grants. Full audit log. Live in minutes. Nothing to install.
Free to start. No card required.
36 Pwno tools catalogued and risk-classified — across an index of 42,500+ MCP servers.