Send keystrokes to a tmux pane (guardrail-checked if press_enter=True).
AI agents invoke send_keys to trigger actions in Post-Exploitation tmux MCP Server. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
Sending keystrokes to a tmux pane with Enter pressed is functionally equivalent to executing arbitrary commands in a terminal. The server is explicitly described as a 'Post-Exploitation' tool, amplifying the blast radius. While guardrails exist, they only apply when press_enter=True, and even with them, the tool can still run a wide range of commands.
From the tool's definition 'Send keystrokes to a tmux pane' with 'press_enter=True' — sending keys with Enter executes commands in a live terminal pane; guardrail-checked but still triggers execution of arbitrary input in a shell context
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Send keystrokes to a tmux pane (guardrail-checked if press_enter=True). It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Post-Exploitation tmux MCP Server MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the Post-Exploitation tmux MCP Server MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for send_keys: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Post-Exploitation tmux MCP Server. Nothing to install.
send_keys is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the send_keys rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for send_keys. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
send_keys is provided by the Post-Exploitation tmux MCP Server MCP server (raghavansv/tmux-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
Teams ship this data inside their own products. See what a licence covers →