async_tool
AI agents call async_tool as a supporting operation in MCP Fooocus API workflows.
The description is empty and the name 'async_tool' provides no meaningful indication of the tool's function or side effects. Given the server context (text-to-image generation), it could be an asynchronous variant of image generation, but this is speculative. Confidence is very low; defaulting to Other due to insufficient information.
From the tool's definition Tool name is 'async_tool' with an empty description. No functional information is available to determine what this tool does.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
async_tool. It is categorised as a Other tool in the MCP Fooocus API MCP Server, which means it performs auxiliary operations.
Register the MCP Fooocus API MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for async_tool: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches MCP Fooocus API. Nothing to install.
async_tool is a Other tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the async_tool rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for async_tool. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
async_tool is provided by the MCP Fooocus API MCP server (raihan0824/mcp-fooocus-api). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
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