AI agents call teams as a supporting operation in iTerm MCP workflows.
With an empty description, the tool's behavior cannot be determined from the provided information. The name 'teams' on an iTerm MCP server with sibling tools like 'agents', 'orchestrate', 'roles', and 'managers' suggests it may manage team or group configurations for AI orchestration, which would likely be a Read or Write operation.
From the tool's definition Tool name is 'teams' and description is empty; no information about what this tool does.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
teams. It is categorised as a Other tool in the iTerm MCP MCP Server, which means it performs auxiliary operations.
Register the iTerm MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for teams: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches iTerm MCP. Nothing to install.
teams is a Other tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the teams rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for teams. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
teams is provided by the iTerm MCP server (research-developer/iterm-mcp-claude-agency). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
Teams ship this data inside their own products. See what a licence covers →