Remove a tag from a task or note.
AI agents use untag_item to create or update resources in Streamline MCP — usually the action step of a workflow, after the agent has gathered context. Every call changes real data in your Streamline MCP environment.
Removing a tag is a reversible modification — the tag can be re-applied — so this is a Write operation rather than Destructive. However, misuse could strip organizational metadata from many items, giving it medium severity.
From the tool's definition Remove a tag from a task or note
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Remove a tag from a task or note. It is categorised as a Write tool in the Streamline MCP MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
Register the Streamline MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for untag_item: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Streamline MCP. Nothing to install.
untag_item is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the untag_item rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for untag_item. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
untag_item is provided by the Streamline MCP server (rostehea/streamline-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Every MCP server has a record like this.
Type a name, get the same breakdown: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, capabilities, recommended policy.
Teams ship this data inside their own products. See what a licence covers →