agenticow — write vectors (with optional text payloads) into an .rvf memory branch or base. Records: [{id?, vector, text?}] — id auto-assigns when omitted. This is the write half that makes a branch usable: agenticow_branch creates an empty COW child, but without ingest it has nothing to read bac...
AI agents use agenticow_ingest to create or update resources in Ruflo — usually the action step of a workflow, after the agent has gathered context. Every call changes real data in your Ruflo environment.
This is a Write operation—it creates and modifies data (vector embeddings and associated text payloads) in persistent storage. It is reversible in principle (entries can be deleted or replaced) and does not irreversibly destroy data or execute arbitrary code.
From the tool's definition Tool description explicitly states it is the 'write half' that populates vectors and text payloads into memory branches. Key phrases: 'write vectors', 'ingest into a branch', 'populate the branch'.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
agenticow — write vectors (with optional text payloads) into an .rvf memory branch or base. Records: [{id?, vector, text?}] — id auto-assigns when omitted. This is the write half that makes a branch usable: agenticow_branch creates an empty COW child, but without ingest it has nothing to read back. Use when you have branched and must populate the branch (agenticow_branch alone leaves it empty). Editing the base directly is wrong when the writes are speculative — ingest into a branch, then promote only if validated. Persists via .agenticow.json lineage manifest. It is categorised as a Write tool in the Ruflo MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
Register the Ruflo MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for agenticow_ingest: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Ruflo. Nothing to install.
agenticow_ingest is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the agenticow_ingest rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for agenticow_ingest. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
agenticow_ingest is provided by the Ruflo MCP server (ruvnet/ruflo). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
agenticow_ingest is one line of Ruflo's registry record.
The record carries the whole server: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, every tool classified, recommended policy — re-checked continuously.
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