browser_hover

SERVERRuflo SOURCEruvnet/ruflo

High RISK CLASS

Category Execute

Parameters 00 required

Recommended Rate-limitedsee the rule below

Registry record Grade F, identity unverified Pull the record →

This record as markdown: /tools/ruflo/browser-hover.md

WHAT IT DOES

What browser_hover does on Ruflo

AI agents invoke browser_hover to trigger actions in Ruflo. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call: builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.

RISK

Why browser_hover is rated High

This tool executes real browser automation actions (hovering over DOM elements), which can trigger JavaScript events, reveal hidden UI elements, or be part of a larger automated browser workflow including login flows and SPA scraping. It has side effects dependent on the target page's event handlers. Classified as Execute due to triggering external browser operations whose effects depend on arguments.

From the tool's definition Hover over an element using ref (@e1) or CSS selector — browser automation action that triggers real browser interaction, JS-heavy SPA scraping, login flows with cookie reuse

Attacks that exploit this kind of access

RECOMMENDED RULE

The rule that runs browser_hover safely

PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Ruflo, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For browser_hover, this is the rule to start with:

browser_hover Rate-limited

browser_hover stays usable, but rate-capped: a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.

View as policy code

policy.json

{
  "version": "1",
  "default": "deny",
  "tools": {
    "browser_hover": {
      "limits": [
        {
          "counter": "browser_hover_rate",
          "window": "minute",
          "max": 10,
          "scope": "grant"
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}

RATE-LIMIT THIS TOOL → Instant setup, no code required.

The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Ruflo, apply this rule, and every browser_hover call is checked against it from then on.

FAQ

Questions about browser_hover

What does the browser_hover tool do? +

Hover over an element using ref (@e1) or CSS selector Use when native WebFetch is wrong because you need real browser automation — JS-heavy SPA scraping, login flows with cookie reuse, replay against DOM-drifted versions, AIDefence PII gating before content reaches Claude. For static HTML pages, native WebFetch is faster and free. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Ruflo MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.

How do I enforce a policy on browser_hover? +

Register the Ruflo MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for browser_hover: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Ruflo. Nothing to install.

What risk level is browser_hover? +

browser_hover is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.

Can I rate-limit browser_hover? +

Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the browser_hover rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.

How do I block browser_hover completely? +

Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for browser_hover. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.

What MCP server provides browser_hover? +

browser_hover is provided by the Ruflo MCP server (ruvnet/ruflo). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.

KEEP EXPLORING

More on Ruflo, and thousands of servers like it.

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All 496 Ruflo tools → High-risk tools on this server →

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browser_click on Percepta MCP Server → All high-risk MCP tools → The MCP Attack Database →

Guides

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