Hover over an element using ref (@e1) or CSS selector Use when native WebFetch is wrong because you need real browser automation — JS-heavy SPA scraping, login flows with cookie reuse, replay against DOM-drifted versions, AIDefence PII gating before content reaches Claude. For static HTML pages, ...
AI agents invoke browser_hover to trigger actions in Ruflo. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
This tool executes real browser automation actions (hovering over DOM elements), which can trigger JavaScript events, reveal hidden UI elements, or be part of a larger automated browser workflow including login flows and SPA scraping. It has side effects dependent on the target page's event handlers. Classified as Execute due to triggering external browser operations whose effects depend on arguments.
From the tool's definition Hover over an element using ref (@e1) or CSS selector — browser automation action that triggers real browser interaction, JS-heavy SPA scraping, login flows with cookie reuse
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Hover over an element using ref (@e1) or CSS selector Use when native WebFetch is wrong because you need real browser automation — JS-heavy SPA scraping, login flows with cookie reuse, replay against DOM-drifted versions, AIDefence PII gating before content reaches Claude. For static HTML pages, native WebFetch is faster and free. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Ruflo MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the Ruflo MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for browser_hover: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Ruflo. Nothing to install.
browser_hover is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the browser_hover rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for browser_hover. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
browser_hover is provided by the Ruflo MCP server (ruvnet/ruflo). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
browser_hover is one line of Ruflo's registry record.
The record carries the whole server: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, every tool classified, recommended policy — re-checked continuously.
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