claims_mark-stealable
Mark an issue as stealable by other agents Use when nothing native covers per-agent capability gating — Claude Code agents have file-system access by default. Pair claims_grant + claims_check before letting an agent run privileged ops. For trusted in-session work, no claims call is needed.
This record as markdown: /tools/ruflo/claims-mark-stealable.md
What claims_mark-stealable does on Ruflo
AI agents use claims_mark-stealable to create or update resources in Ruflo, usually the action step of a workflow, after the agent has gathered context. Every call changes real data in your Ruflo environment.
Why claims_mark-stealable is rated Medium
This tool creates or modifies access control state ('mark as stealable') reversibly, making it Write category. Severity is high because misconfiguration could allow unauthorized agents to access privileged operations (file-system, code execution) by incorrectly marking issues as stealable.
From the tool's definition Tool name 'claims_mark-stealable' and description states 'Mark an issue as stealable by other agents' — this modifies permission/capability state.
Risk signalsAdmin/system-level operation
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs claims_mark-stealable safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Ruflo, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For claims_mark-stealable, this is the rule to start with:
claims_mark-stealable stays usable, but capped: an agent stuck in a loop can't make hundreds of changes a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Ruflo, apply this rule, and every claims_mark-stealable call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about claims_mark-stealable
Mark an issue as stealable by other agents Use when nothing native covers per-agent capability gating — Claude Code agents have file-system access by default. Pair claims_grant + claims_check before letting an agent run privileged ops. For trusted in-session work, no claims call is needed. It is categorised as a Write tool in the Ruflo MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
Register the Ruflo MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for claims_mark-stealable: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Ruflo. Nothing to install.
claims_mark-stealable is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the claims_mark-stealable rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for claims_mark-stealable. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
claims_mark-stealable is provided by the Ruflo MCP server (ruvnet/ruflo). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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